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Conflict of Laws
OPERATION OF AMERICAN LAWS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL
UNITED STATES AS ESTABLISHED BY JUDICIAL DECLARATION
Introduction
The ancient notion' that a sovereign's power extended to his subjects
no matter where they traveled is retained in the concept of personal
jurisdiction.2 Less apparent are vestiges of the once contemporaneous
idea3 that the substantive laws of the sovereign also followed the citizen.
Thus, while the courts of a nation may readily exert jurisdiction over
the person of a citizen, they less often choose to take jurisdiction over
the subject matter or to apply that nation's law to the merits of the
controversy.
Although as a matter of power, the nation of citizenship may extra-
territorially apply its law to its citizens, 4 it is commonplace to say that
a party's rights and obligations will be adjudicated according to the law
of the place where the acts occurred. The policy supporting this rule was
stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co.:5
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where
he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with
the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations,
which the other state concerned justly might resent.
But the rule of lex loci delicti does not exclusively control. Substantive
American laws do operate outside the territorial United States; and there
are several means by which the laws are given this effect.
Laws may operate extraterritorially by reason of a bilateral under-
standing, established by express agreement, viz., by treaty,6 or by Comity.7
The United States Supreme Court, in Hilton v. Guyot s gave effect to a
French judgment that American citizens owed money to a French firm,
stating:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one
nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by
legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the
dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have
been content to call the 'comity of nations.'
1 Liu, Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline, in 118 STUDIES IN HISTORY,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 23 (1925); Kassan, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the
Ancient World, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 240 (1935).
2 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); cf. McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
3 See III ENcYC. Soc. Scs. 213 (1930); Liu, op. cit. supra note 1, at 27-29.
4 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952).
5 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
6 9 STAT. 276 (1848). See also Liu, op. cit. supra note 1, at 91-94.
7 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
8 Id. at 163.
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This statement by the Court, although it does not refer to treaties,
demonstrates a reciprocal relation between the nations involved. But to
the extent, that it does not otherwise contemplate the force of law outside
the territorial boundaries of a political unit, it is too narrow a delineation.
Laws may be given extraterritorial operation by unilateral legislative
action. The legislature may give effect to laws or decrees of another
nation, 9 or, on the other hand, extend, by specific provision, the operation
of local law outside the territorial boundaries.' 0 But in the latter situation,
the statute may not clearly express whether the law is to operate extra-
territorially, and it is for the courts to determine whether the legislature
intended the law to be given such effect. The judicial declaration that a
law does so operate does not depend upon comity, or treaty, or any form
of bilateral relationship. Indeed, this situation represents quite the oppo-
site; whereas the courts of this country have evidenced a bilateral relation-
ship by giving effect to foreign judgments and legislation, there is no
bilateral relation where they extend, by interpretation, the operation of
American laws to foreign nations. This should be immediately obvious in
a situation where the cause of action arises between Americans, is litigated
in an American court, but the act giving rise to the cause of action occurs
outside the United States." The federal courts could, without reference to
comity, declare that a statute passed by Congress has legal effects on
litigants' acts committed outside the United States.
The policies which govern determination of the extraterritoriality of
local law are not well articulated. The reasons for keeping the "sov-
ereignty" of foreign nations inviolate seem clear.12 On the other hand,
insofar as the extraterritorial operation of a statute is a matter of inter-
pretation,' 5 it is not altogether clear what the considerations are which
favor extension. Probable considerations include vindication of the
home sovereign's power over its citizens,14 the imposition of social re-
sponsibility, 15 and the prevention of unfair trade practices where other
Americans may be injured.16
The importance of the relationship which judicial interpretation bears
to extraterritoriality is present in the statutes which deal with private
and governmental activity outside the forty-eight states.'
7
9 CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 793 (West 1956). See Coumas v. Superior Court,
31 Cal.2d 682, 192 P.2d 449, 450 (1948).
10 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); accord, Canada
Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537 (1883); Doyle v. French Telegraph
Cable Co., 244 App. Div. 586, 280 N.Y. Supp. 281 (1935).
11 See Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
12 See note 5 supra; The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 135, 136 (1812).
is Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952).
14 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932).
15 See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connel, 335 U.S. 377, 390 (1948).
16 See Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944).
17 Note the significance of the interpretation given the word "possession" by the
Court in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) in the light of the
similar wording in statutes cited in footnote 12 of the Court's opinion. 335 U.S. at
386-87.
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In observing the conditions under which the courts of this country
will or will not apply its laws, a few factors appear significant: (a)
whether or not the acts of another government are drawn into the
litigation, either directly or collaterally, so that the courts must pass
upon the legality of those acts; (b) the foreign nation's system of
jurisprudence; (c) the effect on local foreign conditions of a determina-
tion that the law operates extraterritorially; and (d) the nature of the
claim sought to be vindicated.
Acts of the Foreign Government
The principal reason for reluctance' s in deciding that statutes operate
extraterritorially is that this extension of such laws is repugnant to the
sovereignty of the other nation. However, there appear to be degrees of
repugnancy. Where the sovereignty tof another nation is not involved, the
Supreme Court has been quick to find that the United States law operates
extraterritorially. 19 But if a decision on the merits will clearly draw into
judgment the legality of the foreign nation's acts, the courts decline even
to make a decision whether or not the American laws so operate.2 0 Be-
tween these extremes is a middle ground wherein the act of the foreign
government is only collaterally involved, and the judicial determination
will not necessarily include a judgment of the legality of the other
nation's act. When the declaration will not be inconsistent with the
maintenance of foreign sovereignty, the courts will consider the merits
of the case and for the same reason, be more inclined to give extra-
territorial effect to the law of the United States.
The nature of acts performed by foreign governments examined
together with the judicial reaction thereto establishes whether a nation's
sovereignty will be affronted should the court adjudicate the case. In
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,21 General Villa, acting for the revolution-
ary forces in Mexico, seized leather hides in the possession of one
Martinez. Suit was brought in the United States by parties claiming title
in the goods at the time of seizure against parties who had received the
goods from Villa. The Supreme Court declined to decide the question of
wrongful taking, commenting that the revolutionary Carranza faction
represented the government of Mexico and that the Court would not re-
examine the acts of another sovereign state.2 2 In another Mexican
18 See note 12 supra.
19 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). The Court stated, 313 U.S. at 76:
"Even if it were assumed that the locus of the offense was outside the territorial
waters of Florida, it would not follow that the State could not prohibit it own
citizens from the use of the described divers' equipment at that place."
20 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). The same
result obtains even when the foreign government is not recognized by the govern-
ment of the United States, but has a de faeto existence. Wulfsohn v. Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923), appeal dis-
missed per curiam, 266 U.S. 580 (1924).
21 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
22 Id. at 304.
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situation, 23 the petitioner imported parts of watches into Mexico where
they were assembled and stamped with the mark "Bulova." It was alleged
that the petitioner, a citizen of the United States, violated the Lanham
Act. Petitioner pleaded in defense that he had previously procured the
Mexican registration of the trade-mark "Bulova." The district court
refused to grant the injunction and the other relief prayed for. After the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari, but before it decided the case,
the Supreme Court of Mexico upheld an administrative ruling which
nullified petitioner's Mexican registration of the trade-mark. The United
States Supreme Court pointed out specifically there was no question be-
fore it as to whether a valid foreign registration would affect either the
power to enjoin or the propriety of its exercise, and had little difficulty in
deciding that Congress, in passing the Lanham Act, intended it to operate
extraterritorially. 24 That Mexico had a trade-mark registration law made
no difference.
The matter which the Supreme Court did not have to consider in
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., i.e., what the result should be if the trade-
mark of Mexico were not nullified, was recently considered in a district
court. 25 There the Mexican registration of the trade-mark "Las Palmas"
was still in effect. Plaintiff was a citizen of California. The corporate
defendant was incorporated in California; of the two individual defend-
ants, one was a citizen of California and the other a citizen of Mexico.
Plaintiff, owner of the validly registered United States trade-mark "Las
Palmas" (used on canned food products), brought suit under the Lanham
Act, and sought to enjoin defendant's use of the name "Las Palmas." The
court issued the injunction, ordering the defendants to cease using the
name "Las Palmas" in either the United States or the Republic of
Mexico. The court considered the matter of Mexico's sovereignty and
decided there was no affront to it after examining the nature of the
Mexican registration law.26 The Mexican law was interpreted so as to
make it and the Lanham Act compatible although contemporaneously
effective.
The Oetjen case and Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. demonstrate the
difference in result which can be expected when the acts of a foreign
23 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
24 Id. at 289. But see 3 CALLmAN, UNFAIR COMPETION AND TRAnE-MAaxS
§ 76.4 (2d ed. 1950):
"The law of trade-marks rests upon the doctrine of nationality or terri-
toriality. The United States and most other countries respect this basic
premise. The scope of protection is, therefore, determined by the law of the
country in which protection is sought, and international agreements for the
protection of industrial property are predicated upon the same principle."
25 Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.Ca. 1956).
26 "For at the most defendants' Mexican registration of plaintiff's mark can
have no greater effect than to confer upon defendants a license or permission to use
the mark in Mexico ...
"It should perhaps be emphasized that plaintiff does not seek a determination that
any act of a foreign sovereign is invalid." Id. at 602.
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government are, or are not involved. The case involving the "Las Palmas"
trade-mark illustrates a situation where the "act" of a foreign government
is involved; but the facts place it in the area between these two cases.
The Court, in Oetjen, in order to arrive at a decision on the merits, would
necessarily have had to consider the legality of the seizure by the Mexican
government; that act would have been directly drawn in question. Since
the court in the "Las Palmas" case construed the Mexican law so as to
find no conflict, the "act" of that government in registering (or licensing)
the trade-mark may be characterized as only a collateral factor. Whereas
in Oetjen, the Court declined to decide on the merits, the court in the
"Las Palmas" case did not; once the court in the latter case overcame
the jurisdictional hurdle, it proceeded to give extraterritorial effect to the
statute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
refused to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially where the defendants
were Canadian nationals using a trade-mark registered in Canada. 27
The plaintiffs were owners of the same trade-mark registered in the
United States. The court in examining Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.
thought three factors were stressed: 28 (1) the defendant's conduct had a
substantial effect on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was a
United States citizen; and (3) there was no conflict with trade-mark
rights established under the foreign law, since defendant's Mexican re-
gistration had been cancelled. The court said the absence of one of the
above factors might well be determinative and the absence of two would
be fatal; and that only the first of the three factors was present in the case
under consideration. In the "Las Palmas" trade-mark case, the first factor
was present. But, in the view of the Second Circuit, it would seem the
third factor was not present; and the second factor was only partically
present, since one of the individual defendants was a Mexican citizen.
Yet the court in the "Las Palmas" case applied the Lanham Act extra-
territorially. This result, in light of the foregoing analysis, further en-
courages the conclusion that the manner in which the act of the foreign
government is drawn into the litigation-collaterally or directly-is deter-
minative in the choice whether a decision will be rendered on the merits.
The presumption of territoriality is mentioned in American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. where suit was brought to recover treble dam-
ages under the Sherman Act for defendant's conspiracy with Costa Rican
authorities to seize the plaintiff's lands and supplies with the express
purpose of driving the plaintiff out of the market. The Court said
"...the general and almost universal rule is that the character of
an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done."'29 Proceeding from this view-
point, the Court reasoned that since law is what the sovereign de-
clares it to be, and since the government of Costa Rica was alleged
27 Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 871 (1956).
28 Id. at 642. See note 23 supra.
29 213 U.S. at 356.
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to have taken part in the conspiracy, there was no tort committed. s 0
But another reason was assigned for the decision, viz., Congress pro-
bably did not intend that the Act apply extraterritorially, since the
presumption is that "all legislation is prima facie territorial." 3' This
latter reason was ignored by the district court in Sanib Corp. v. United
Fruit Co. 3 2 Excepting the difference that no act of a foreign govern-
ment was involved, the factual situation was very nearly like that of
American Banana Co. This difference was the distinction the court drew
upon in deciding that American Banana Co. did not control; the court
held that the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially, passing over the
presumption of territoriality. The absence of action by the foreign
government made the difference. Although the court indicated that acts
effectuating the conspiracy were partly performed in the United States,
this was not a point of distinction. 33
The court in Branch v. Federal Trade Commissions4 did not stress
the same distinction as did the Sanib court, but said all the acts of the
defendant in American Banana Co., occurring in Panama and Costa Rica,
were not considered actionable wrongs there. It said further that suit was
not brought in American Banana Co. in an attempt to protect resident
competitors from "defflement of commerce originating in the United
States."3 5 The holding in Branch that the purpose of the Federal Trade
Commission Act was to protect competitors at home is hardly a basis for
distinction. Competition could only exist if the firms sought to be pro-
tected did business in those countries as defendant; if that were so, there
would not be substantial difference between that case and American
30 Id. at 357. It is interesting to note how Holmes' positivistic attitude toward
the law influenced the decision. Proceeding from the premise that law is simply
what the sovereign declares it to be, Holmes' conclusion that there was no tort at
all is logically inescapable. But it is submitted that the seizure of property under the
circumstances of this case is "tortious" no matter who did it, and that if a sovereign
is not to be held accountable, then it is because the policy of "maintaining sover-
eignty" is greater than that of obtaining restitution from the wrongdoer; the basis
for the decision ought to be immunity, not that there was no wrong. Under this
view, although the government is not liable, the other party to the conspiracy may
be considered to be; here, it would be United Fruit Co. There are many analogies
where, although one actor is free from liability, a joint actor, because of a difference
in status, is not free. E.g., Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393 (1876); see Contino v.
Baltimore & Annapolis R.R., 178 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
927 (1951); accord, Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 568 (1939).
81 Id. at 357.
82 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court said, in distinguishing the
American Banana Co. decision, at 135 F.Supp. 766: "The American Banana Co.
decision is not contrary. There the complaint was viewed as claiming damage not
from the alleged monopoly as such, but from seizure of the plaintiff's property by a
foreign government at the defendant's urging."
33 lbid. It is submitted that in any case of similar nature, i.e, where the defen-
dant is an American corporation, the court could find that part of the acts occurred
in the United States.
34 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
35 Id. at 35.
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Banana Co.8 6 The distinction ought to be that no act of a foreign govern-
ment was involved. The possibility that the other government had
adequate controls on business activity in that country, or that it pre-
ferred no such restraints was not discussed.
An attempt to circumvent the hands-off policy of the courts when the
act of a foreign government is drawn into litigation has been made on
the basis that such a policy applies only to "physical acts."137 Although
that contention has been rejected, the distinction is novel. The assertion
is that seizure of property would involve a "physical act" of the govern-
ment, whereas registering a trade-mark would not; and that the cases
effectuating the policy of non-interference have only been concerned with
the former. Decisions giving effect to foreign legislation,38 not having
to do with seizure of property, but affecting property rights of Americans,
refute the distinction by refraining from an examination of that legislation.
The Other Nation's System of Jurisprudence
It has been said that American law will apply where the alternative
would be a resort to "no law that civilized countries would recognize as
adequate. . . ."39 This theory was utilized in a case where an American
citizen who, while temporarily in Saudi Arabia, was injured in a collision
with a truck driven by one of defendant's employees. The defendant was
an American corporation.4 0 In seeking to have the court apply American
law, plaintiff urged that Saudi Arabia had "no law or legal system" and
contended, in effect, that the nation was uncivilized. Although the judg-
ment of dismissal was affirmed, the writer of the opinion, Judge Frank,
thought the case ought to have been remanded so the plaintiff could
prove Saudi Arabia had no "civilized" legal system, and therefore, that
American law would apply.4 1
The importance of the differences in civilization 42 was recognized in
treaties as early as 1830.43 This difference, while once widely made
efficacious through treaties, has not often been considered in the cases.
The holding that American law ought to apply where the foreign nation
is not "civilized" works out quite well in that the countries which are not
"civilized" are also those which seem to be closest to the ancient concepts
86 See note 32 supra.
87 Pasos v. Pan American Airways, 229 F.2d 271, 272-273 (2d Cir. 1956).
a8 See, e.g., Doyle v. French Telegraph Cable Co., 244 App. Div. 586, 280
N.Y. Supp. 281 (1935).
39 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-356 (1909)
(dictum). See also Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 129 (1904)
(dictum).
40 Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
41 Id. at 546.
42 Letter from Commissioner Cushing to Secretary of State Calhoun, MS. STATE
Dm"'T, Sept. 29, 1844, printed as Rationale of Extraterritoriality, 1 Extraterritorial
Cases 4.
43 Treaty with the Ottoman Porte, May 7, 1830, art. IV, 8 STAT. 409. Dainese
v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13 (1875) discusses this and related treaties.
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of jurisdiction, i.e., the idea that the law of the tribe or nation followed the
individual. The concept of territoriality arises contemporaneously with
the advance of civilization, and it is not until the foreign nation becomes
sophisticated, by way of a legal system, that there is a conflict in the
mutual exercise of jurisdiction.44
Effect on Local Foreign Conditions
In situations where the application of American law outside the United
States will have a direct bearing upon the social or economic conditions
of the other nation, the courts hesitate to interpret United States law so
that it operates extraterritorialiy. On the other hand, where there is no
such influence, and the United States has in some way an interest in
applying its law to activities outside the country, the courts are not so
inclined to give effect to the presumption that Congress did not intend
the law to apply outside the country.
An area in Bermuda, leased by Great Britain, was considered a
"possession" of the United States under the Fair Labor Standards Act so
that the employees of government contractors working on the Bermuda
base could successfully sue for overtime under that act.45 The importance
of that construction is emphasized when statutes with similar wording are
examined.46 Although the decision turned on the interpretation of the
word "possession," and not on the determination that Congress otherwise
intended the act to operate extraterritorially, such operation was the net
effect. 47 The identical statute was not given extraterritorial operation in
Foley Bros. v. Filardo,48 where the plaintiff also presented a claim for
overtime. Services were rendered by plaintiff while he was in Iran and
employed by the defendant, a government contractor. The court, in
granting judgment for the defendant, pointed out that to construe the
statute so that it would apply to the plaintiff would necessarily require a
construction that it also applied to local laborers in Iran; this the Court
would not do. 49
This same effect on local labor that restrained the Court in Foley Bros.
also operated in a case before the Court of Claims. There a Filipino
plaintiff employed by the United States Army in the Phillipine Islands
brought suit for annual leave under a federal statute which provided that
44 See notes 1 and 2 supra.
45 Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), four judges dissenting.
46 See note 17 supra.
47 That the Court may have gone too far is indicated in United States v. Spelar,
338 U.S. 217 (1949).
48 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
49 The Court stated, 336 U.S. at 286:
"No distinction is drawn therein between laborers who are aliens and those
who are citizens of the United States. Unless we were to read such a dis-
tinction into the statute we should be forced to conclude, under respon-
dent's reasoning, that Congress intended to regulate the working hours of a
citizen of Iran who chanced to be employed on a public work of the United
States in that foreign land. Such a conclusion would be logically'inescapable
although labor conditions in Iran were known to be wholly dissimilar to
those in the United States and wholly beyond the control of this nation."
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such leave be given to all employees of the United States.50 Speaking of
Congress, the court said, "It gave no thought to the question of native
labor in foreign countries, though it did make the statute applicable to
United States employees 'stationed' abroad." 51 This court and the Su-
preme Court in Foley Bros. saw in each instance that Congress intended
the respective statutes only to apply to domestic situations.
Since local conditions in other countries would have been directly
affected through the assumption of jurisdiction by the National Mediation
Board over labor disputes arising in those countries, the Railway Labor
Act, empowering the Board to act, was declared to be inoperative outside
the United States.52 Without a countervailing interest in the promotion
of peaceable labor relations present, intervention ought to have been
avoided.
On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission Act was applied
extraterritorially in Branch v. Federal Trade Commission.53 But there
the effect of extraterritoriality on local socio-economic conditions could
hardly have been serious; and whatever effect there may have been
clearly appeared salutary. Probably more important, there was present the
stated interest of the United States in regulating trade practices between
American corporations. 54
There was no element of immediacy of effect on local conditions in
Sanib v. United Fruit Co., where the Sherman Act was applied extra-
territorially. Nor was there such an element present in Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States,55 where the Supreme Court ordered inter-
corporate holdings be dissolved when a domestic corporation had agreed
with two foreign corporations upon a mutually exclusive international
marketing arrangement. The same factor was absent in the cases which
applied the Lanham Act extraterritorialy.56
The Nature of the Claim Sought to be Vindicated
The distinction between transitory actions and actions which are local
because their "cause is in its nature necessarily local," 57 is carried over
into the area of international law. In at least one situation, the nature
of the claim is such that courts of the United States will not even take
jurisdiction, much less apply American law extraterritorially. In Pasos v.
Pan American Airways, 58 involving an action to recover damages for an
50 Luna v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 52, 108 F. Supp. 510 (1952).
51 Id. at 58, 108 F. Supp. at 513.
52 Air Line Dispatchers Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 189 F.2d 685 (D.C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
58 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
54 Although the element of governmental interest in business responsibility abroad
was not mentioned in Branch, a Canadian court saw it as a ground for acknow-
ledging the jurisdiction of the Quebec Securities Commission outside the province.
N.Y. Times, June 10, 1957, p.37, col. 6.
55 341 U.S..593 (1951).
56 See notes 23 and 25 supra.
57 Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8411, at 664 (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
58 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956).
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alleged trespass to lands in Nicaragua, the court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, stating that the nature of the claim was local.
Conclusion
Recent cases which have had to consider the question whether a law
operates extraterritorially bear out the vigor of the rule that the laws
of a nation do not operate outside the boundaries of that nation except
by the intent of the legislature. In the service of determining this intent,
the courts have evinced certain policies which may be taken as signposts.
These policies center on the notion of sovereignty.
A court will not sit in judgment on another nation's acts, although
the legislative acts of that nation may be subject to interpretation by the
court. Refusal to so judge has resulted in failure to decide on the merits
of cases. That the government of another nation has the power to reg-
ulate a field of activity, and that a litigant is engaged in such field of
activity in that country, is no bar to the extension of the laws of this
country to that same field of activity. Where the sovereignty of the other
nation is not likely to be offended, as it was not in Steele v. Bulova Watch,
or where overriding considerations such as inadequacy of the law of the
foreign country are present, the courts are not disinclined to apply the
law of the United States; this is especially true if the government of this
country has an interest, such as in the regulation of trade practices
between domestic corporations, in the extraterritorial operation of the
law.
Eugene F. Waye
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